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Bringing Balance to the Force:              
The Militarization of America’s Police 
Force and its Consequences 
ANTA PLOWDEN* 
The current trend in the militarization of police can be 
traced back to the earliest times in our country. We are soon 
approaching a tipping point in which the combination of ag-
gressive military tactics, wrongful deaths and injuries, and 
a lack of accountability will lead to an increase in civil un-
rest and animosity towards those who have sworn to uphold 
the law. In an ironic twist of fate, the military force, which 
law enforcement is trying to emulate, has made sharp ad-
justments in the way it operates due to the missions in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. It has adopted more police-like behavior 
in order to afford civilians the protections that, in many 
cases, are not given to American citizens. 
This Comment will discuss the history of American po-
licing and how it gradually became more militarized. It will 
then discuss the consequences of this hyper-militarization 
and how it affects not only civilians, but officers as well. 
Then the focus will shift to the problems with the military 
being used to handle domestic disturbances and how the mil-
itary has adapted to its new role in a post-9/11 world. Fi-
nally, it will make recommendations to restore trust in the 
police force and allow them to safely and effectively accom-
plish their mission of upholding the law. 
 
                                                                                                             
 *  J.D. Candidate 2017, University of Miami School of Law. Former Officer 
and Pilot in the United States Air Force. I would like to thank my family, friends, 
members of the University of Miami Law Review, and the University of Miami 
School of Law. I would especially like to thank Major Ryan Scott David, a friend, 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine you are a 7-year-old girl sleeping on a couch with your 
grandmother. All of a sudden, a flash-bang grenade wakes you from 
your sleep and a group of armed men kick in your front door. In the 
middle of all of the confusion, a shot rings out, you feel a sharp pain 
and look down, and you begin to see red seep through your favorite 
pajamas. What if those armed men were actually a police special 
response team executing a midnight raid on a home that would be 
part of a reality television show? This story may sound outlandish, 
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but this is exactly what happened to 7-year-old Aiyana Stanley-
Jones in Detroit, Michigan, in May of 2010.1 
Imagine now that you are a 12-year-old boy, playing in a park 
with your toy gun. After taking out all of the imaginary bad guys, 
you put your toy gun in your waistband and take a seat at a nearby 
table. All of a sudden a car drives off of the street, across the park 
and comes to a screeching halt right in front of you. Two men exit 
the vehicle and yell something at you that you cannot quite make 
out. Before you can respond, a shot rings out, you feel a sharp pain 
and look down and you begin to see red seep through your favorite 
jacket. What if those two men in the car were police officers that 
were asked to investigate a suspicious character who may have a 
gun? This is not another outlandish story, this is what happened to 
12-year-old Tamir Rice in Cleveland, Ohio, in November of 2014.2 
How is it that America’s police force has shot and killed more peo-
ple in March of 2015 than the United Kingdom did in the entire 20th 
century?3 
In the town of Keene, New Hampshire, a town that has only seen 
two murders between 2009 and 2014, local police have acquired a 
Ballistic Engineered Armored Response Counter Attack Truck 
(“BearCat”) from the Department of Defense.4 In Columbia, South 
Carolina, local police were able to obtain a Mine-Resistant Ambush 
Protected Vehicle (“MRAP”) from the Department of Defense in 
order to protect the city streets.5 How does equipment suited for the 
battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan end up on Main Street? What 
                                                                                                             
 1 See Kate Abbey-Lambertz, How A Police Officer Shot A Sleeping 7-Year-
Old To Death, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 17, 2014, 5:39 PM), http://www.huffing-
tonpost.com/2014/09/17/aiyana-stanley-jones-joseph-weekley-trial_n_5824684.
html (last updated Oct. 2, 2014). 
 2 See Sean Flynn, The Tamir Rice Story: How to Make a Police Shooting 
Disappear, GQ (July 14, 2016, 6:01 AM), http://www.gq.com/story/tamir-rice-
story. 
 3 See Matt Agorist, American Cops Just Killed More People in March than 
the UK Did in the Entire 20th Century, FREE THOUGHT PROJECT (Apr. 6, 2015), 
http://thefreethoughtproject.com/american-cops-killed-people-month-march-uk-
entire-20th-century/. 
 4 Aaron Cantú, 4 shocking examples of police militarization in America’s 
small towns, SALON (Mar. 28, 2014, 8:00 AM), http://www.salon.com/2014/03/2
8/4_shocking_examples_of_police_militarization_in_americas_small_towns_
partner/. 
 5 Id. 
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happens when you place military-grade weapons designed to kill in 
the hands of those who are meant to serve and protect?  What hap-
pens when keeping the peace becomes a war on the streets? What 
happens when the civilian is viewed as the enemy combatant? 
This Comment will look at the history of America’s police force 
and its gradual militarization. It will then analyze the effects of the 
militarization of America’s police force and show how, in many 
ways, police have become more aggressive than actual military 
forces fighting in a warzone. Next, this Comment will explore the 
sordid history of the military’s interaction with civilian protestors. 
It will analyze the changes the military has made to deal with the 
changing battlefield and show that, ironically, the military is becom-
ing more like a police force. Finally, it will look at the training police 
receive and make recommendations for changes to training that will 
help restore balance to the police force. 
I. A LONG TIME AGO IN A GALAXY NOT SO FAR AWAY: COLONIAL 
POLICING AND THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN POLICE FORCE 
In order to understand how we reached a point where tanks are 
needed to patrol city streets, we must look at the history of how po-
lice have operated in America. Radley Balko notes in Rise of the 
Warrior Cop that sheriffs and constables in late eighteenth century 
colonial America served more of an administrative role, and it was 
up to the communities to deal with transgressors.6 As the country 
grew, law enforcement developed differently by region.7 In the 
Northeast, as towns became larger and more diverse, paid night pa-
trols were organized to handle petty crimes, but were unable to han-
dle some of the more violent and organized crime.8 In the South, the 
“slave patrol” became the standard.9 In the Western frontier, law en-
forcement was often accomplished by vigilante groups who would 
                                                                                                             
 6 RADLEY BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP: THE MILITARIZATION OF 
AMERICA’S POLICE FORCES 27–28 (2013) (stating that in the precolonial era, 
crime was synonymous with sin and enforcement was determined by the prevail-
ing traditions and religion of the community). 
 7 See id. at 28. 
 8 See id. 
 9 See id. Because of the homogenous nature of the citizens of the South and 
the fear of slave revolts, these patrols most closely resemble modern police. See 
id. They were armed, uniformed, and authorized to arrest, search, and detain 
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fill the void left by a lack of organized law enforcement and often-
times would be no better than the criminals themselves.10     
What would become the “modern police force” did not arrive in 
the United States until the mid-1800s with the first department in 
New York, followed by Boston and Philadelphia.11 Ironically, at that 
time, police feared being thought of as an army so they patrolled 
without guns or uniforms.12 Police officers were appointed by local 
politicians and required to live in the communities they patrolled.13 
Their duties included everything from law enforcement to running 
the local soup kitchen.14 But because of the need for political con-
nections to become a police officer and the lack of official training, 
law enforcement officers at the time were better known for their in-
competence, brutality, and corruption than for their effectiveness in 
crime prevention or bringing criminals to justice.15 
It was not until the early twentieth century when a series of re-
forms that focused on “professionalism” took hold and the police 
went from an incompetent, corrupt institution to the modern organ-
ization focused primarily on crime control that we know today.16 
Unfortunately, as the emphasis on professionalism increased, the 
connection with the community began to erode.17 As departments 
began to eradicate the patronage system of the nineteenth century, 
the departments became more isolated and less accountable to the 
political leaders and the general public.18 As technological advances 
like radios and patrol cars became more available, individual offic-
ers had fewer interactions with the public they were sworn to protect 
and became, as Balko put it, a “faceless and intimidating pres-
ence.”19 
                                                                                                             
slaves. See id. Eventually every colony in the South passed laws legitimizing these 
patrols, making them the primary means of law enforcement in the region. See id. 
 10 See id. at 29. 
 11 See id. at 30. 
 12 See id. 
 13 See id. 
 14 See, e.g., id. 
 15 See id. at 30–31 (noting how elected ward leaders would exert pressure on 
police commanders to selectively enforce the law in order to guarantee reelec-
tion). 
 16 See id. at 31–32. 
 17 See id. at 34. 
 18 See id. 
 19 Id. 
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A. Crime, Social Unrest, and the Growth of Militarization 
Eventually, early police transitioned from an untrained, incom-
petent force with strong ties to the community that it served, to a 
much more professional, albeit isolated, force focused on crime 
fighting.20 While that is a brief history of early American policing, 
it still does not answer how our police force went from not wanting 
to carry firearms in the mid-1800s to today, where departments think 
that owning a tank is perfectly reasonable.21 This section will look 
at how factors such as increased criminal violence, social unrest, il-
legal drugs, politics, and terrorism have changed the way modern 
police interact with civilians in the twenty-first century. 
Early policing, while effective in most situations, always seemed 
to have trouble when dealing with more violent and organized 
crime.22 One of the earliest examples of police militarization stems 
from the passage of the Volstead Act in 1919, better known as Pro-
hibition.23 The passage of this law led to an increase in criminal vi-
olence as gangs and bootleggers began to arm themselves with dead-
lier weapons.24 In response, law enforcement also felt the need in-
crease that fire power, and the ensuing arms race led to heavily 
armed police forces.25 But it was not until 1965 that police took the 
first major step towards militarization.26 
In the summer of 1965, what started out as a perfectly normal 
“Driving Under the Influence” stop erupted into one of the worst 
riots in American history.27 In the midst of racial tension between 
the Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”) and local minority 
communities, Officer Lee Minkus attempted to arrest Marquette 
Frye for suspicion of driving while intoxicated and driving without 
a license.28 Things quickly escalated when Frye’s family arrived at 
                                                                                                             
 20 See id. at 31–32, 34. 
 21 See id. at 30. See also Cantú, supra note 4. 
 22 See BALKO, supra note 6, at 28. 
 23 See, e.g., id. at 32–33; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1. 
 24 See BALKO, supra note 6, at 32–33. 
 25 Id. at 33. 
 26 See id. at 53. 
 27 See id. at 51; see also DARYL F. GATES, CHIEF: MY LIFE IN THE L.A.P.D. 
88–104 (1992) (providing a description of the Watts narrative and events leading 
up to the riots). 
 28 See BALKO, supra note 6, at 51. 
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the scene and a physical altercation with the police occurred.29 The 
ensuing arrests led to what is known as the Watts Riots, and in the 
six days following the arrest, those riots cost the city of Los Angeles 
over $40 million and left more than 1,000 people injured and thirty-
four dead.30 It was riots like the Watts Riots and those that followed 
in Detroit, Baltimore, and Newark that shocked Middle America.31 
The images of such violence and lawlessness instilled a fear that 
would later be used to usher in new policies that gave police more 
power, authority, and permission to use force.32 
On the ground, police dealing with the riots felt completely over-
whelmed.33 Rioters were taking up sniper positions in buildings, us-
ing Molotov cocktails, and applying guerilla tactics.34 Noting the 
similarity to the tactics used by the enemy combatants in Vietnam, 
the chief of the Los Angeles police force, Daryl Gates, looked to the 
military for help.35 The training and tactics he learned would lead to 
the development of America’s first Special Weapons and Tactics 
(“SWAT”) team.36 
While the riots may have made big cities seem dangerous to the 
average American, it did not take long before those living in suburbs 
began to feel threatened. In August of 1966, in an all too familiar 
scenario, a lone gunman barricaded himself in a clock tower and 
opened fire on students and civilians on the campus of the Univer-
sity of Texas at Austin.37 Armed with multiple rifles, handguns, and 
a shotgun, Charles Whitman was able to take the lives of thirteen 
people and wound over thirty more.38 Police were again left out-
                                                                                                             
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. at 52. 
 31 Id. at 53. 
 32 Id. 
 33 See GATES, supra note 27, at 107–14 (discussing how Gates’ experience in 
Watts led to him becoming an expert in dealing with riots. This is turn led to the 
study of anti-guerilla tactics from the military, and the formation of an anti-sniper 
team which would eventually be known as SWAT.). 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 See BALKO, supra note 6, at 53. 
 37 See id. at 56–57. 
 38 Id. at 57. Oddly enough, after Whitman was killed, he left a note asking for 
doctors to study his brain to see if they can find out where his overly aggressive 
behavior came from. See id. at 58. Doctors found that he had developed a brain 
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gunned and unable to respond to the threat, thus reinforcing the de-
sire of citizens and police forces to have specialized units to deal 
with these kinds of situations.39 It was events like these that brought 
the fear of crime home to the American population; violent crime 
was no longer an inner city issue, but instead could happen to any-
one, anywhere, at any time. 
It was this sentiment that led to the general acceptance of these 
SWAT teams by police forces around the country.40 Police forces 
began actively training with the military and stockpiling arms, such 
as helicopters, sniper rifles, and armored vehicles.41 This was not 
met without resistance; in fact, many people argued that the police 
were supposed to be a civil force, pointing to the Third Amendment 
to support the claim that military-style policing violated the Amend-
ment’s intent.42 In the end, the general sense of increased crime and 
chaos allowed for the acceptance of this more aggressive type of 
policing.43 While the riots and threats of lawlessness grew remote as 
time passed, the militaristic nature of the police force persisted.44 
B. Policing and the War on Drugs 
In June 1971, President Nixon declared a “war on drugs.”45 The 
idea was that by using the metaphor of war, it would galvanize the 
public into action to address this social problem.46 In order to gain 
public support, Nixon and his crime team launched a public relations 
campaign to scare the public about crime by tying crime to heroin.47 
This campaign included everything from planting media stories, to 
                                                                                                             
tumor that affected his amygdala, the part of the brain responsible for fear and 
anger. See id. at 58. 
 39 See id. at 57. 
 40 Id. at 63. 
 41 Id. 
 42 GATES, supra note 27, at 115 (noting that even police leadership initially 
disapproved of SWAT’s quasi-militaristic tactics). See also U.S. CONST. amend. 
III (“No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the 
consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by 
law.”). 
 43 See BALKO, supra note 6, at 64. 
 44 Id. 
 45 American Judicature Society, It is time to end the war on drugs, 93 
JUDICATURE 1 (2009) [hereinafter Judicature]. 
 46 See id. 
 47 See BALKO, supra note 6, at 103–104. 
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recalling ambassadors from countries known to produce heroin, to 
holding high-level strategy sessions for the media to attend.48 Nixon 
even went so far as to declare narcotics to be “public enemy number 
one in the United States.”49 With the success of this campaign, 
Nixon was able to pass a series of crime-related bills that would au-
thorize measures such as preventative detention, extensive wiretap-
ping, and even the “no-knock” raid.50 It was Nixon’s rhetoric that 
shaped America’s current drug policy.51 
The war on drugs has both a foreign and domestic component. 
Military advisors were sent all over Latin America to deal with drug 
cartels in places like Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia.52 This even esca-
lated to an all-out invasion of Panama in 1989 to oust General Ma-
nuel Antonio Noriega.53 With all this military action occurring on 
the foreign front, the question became, “how are the domestic police 
holding up their end of the fight?” With the passage of the Military 
Cooperation with Law Enforcement Act in 1981,54 soldiers and po-
lice not only trained together, but jointly conducted paramilitary op-
erations.55 This included using U2 spy planes to search for drug 
fields and conducting helicopter raids on civilians suspected of 
growing marijuana—raids that were better suited for the hamlets of 
Vietnam than the hills of California.56 In the decades following the 
start of the war on drugs, there has been an increase in the routine 
use of military tactics when arresting nonviolent offenders, resulting 
in (1) dangerous military equipment used in situations where it is 
not needed; (2) “no-knock” raids that not only result in property 
                                                                                                             
 48 Id. 
 49 Judicature, supra note 45, at 1 (internal quotation marks removed). 
 50 See BALKO, supra note 6, at 102. 
 51 See Judicature, supra note 45, at 1. 
 52 See Harry L. Marsh, Law Enforcement, the Military, and the War on 
Drugs: Is the Military Involvement in the War on Drugs Ethical?, 10 AM. J. 
POLICE 61, 65 (1991). 
 53 Id. While the United States justified the invasion as a response to Noriega’s 
declaration of war on the United States and the killing of a U.S. military officer, 
President Bush did speak of the importance of bringing Noriega to the U.S. to 
stand trial for his drug trafficking activities. Id. 
 54 See generally Military Cooperation with Law Enforcement Officials Act 
of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-86, § 905, 95 Stat. 1115 (codified as Military Support for 
Law Enforcement Agencies, 10 U.S.C. §§ 371–83 (1998)). 
 55 See BALKO, supra note 6, at 147–48. 
 56 Id. 
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damage, but also injury and the death of innocent parties; and (3) 
challenges to the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and the protec-
tion it offers citizens.57 
While this war does very little with respect to treatment of drug 
addiction, it did succeed in overwhelming the prison system, leading 
to racial profiling and increasing the polarization of police–commu-
nity relations—especially among minorities.58 Ironically, the harder 
the police cracked down on drug dealers, the more the violence in-
creased.59 As established black markets were upset by crackdowns, 
new players would try to fill the void and power struggles would 
ensue.60 These turf wars would go on to claim the lives of not only 
criminals, but also police and countless civilians.61 
By the 1990s, these paramilitary tactics expanded beyond just 
drug raids.62 Normal investigations ended up turning into multiday 
standoffs, resulting in the wrongful deaths of citizens not involved 
in the drug trade.63 Missteps like Ruby Ridge, Waco, and even Cu-
ban immigrant Elián González increasingly caused the public to 
start questioning the tactics used by civilian law enforcement.64 That 
                                                                                                             
 57 Ronald Goldfarb, Review of Rise of the Warrior Cop: The Militarization of 
America’s Police Forces, 28 WASH. LAW. 42, 42–43 (2013) (reviewing BALKO, 
supra note 6). 
 58 See Judicature, supra note 45, at 1 (noting the effects of congressional leg-
islation that resulted in mandatory minimum sentences for crack possession while 
those who possessed powder cocaine were often able to avoid prison altogether); 
but see Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 2, 124 Stat. 2372 
(amending the Controlled Substances Act and the Controlled Substances Import 
and Export Act by reducing the disparity between crack cocaine and power co-
caine). 
 59 See BALKO, supra note 6, at 97 (describing this as a “self-perpetuating, 
self-escalating feedback loop created by the modern drug war.”). 
 60 See id. at 97. 
 61 Id. 
 62 See id. at 200. 
 63 Id. 
 64 See id. at 200–01 (the Ruby Ridge incident started with the illegal sale of 
sawed-off shotguns and ended with the U.S. Marshalls, local police, F.B.I., and 
the A.T.F. killing a fourteen-year-old boy, both of his parents, and the family 
dog); id. at 201–02 (in Waco, TX, A.T.F. agents conducted an unnecessary six-
week long raid that resulted in the death of seventy-six adults and twenty-six chil-
dren); id. at 204 (I.N.S. led a SWAT team into a civilian home in order to forcibly 
remove González from his relatives and return him to his father in Cuba). 
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is, until one of the darkest days in American history, September 
11th, 2001.65 
C. Policing and the War on Terror 
“[E]very American is a soldier, and every citizen is in this fight” 
were the words used by President Bush following the attacks on 
9/11.66 This threat of terrorism allowed for police departments 
across the country to justify requests for bigger arsenals and more 
equipment; even small towns needed a SWAT team.67 As American 
soldiers geared up to fight terrorism abroad, the constant and ubiq-
uitous threat of another terrorist attack on American soil blurred the 
lines between the military and the increasingly militarized domestic 
police forces.68 Police departments patrolled the streets in armored 
vehicles and increased the frequency of predawn military-style raids 
on civilian homes—all in the name of counterterrorism efforts.69 
The reorganization of state agencies under the newly-formed 
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) gave local police de-
partments access to immense budgets.70 By 2007, “eighty percent of 
U.S. towns with a population between twenty-five thousand and 
fifty thousand people maintained a SWAT team.”71 Equipment such 
as grenade launchers, which in the 1960s required permission from 
the Department of Defense to use,72 are today collecting dust in at 
                                                                                                             
 65 Cynthia A. Brown, Divided Loyalties: Ethical Challenges for America’s 
Law Enforcement in Post 9/11 America, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 651, 658 
(2011). 
 66 Elisabeth Bumiller, A Nation Challenged: The President; Bush Announces 
a Crackdown on Visa Violators, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2001), http://www.ny-
times.com/2001/10/30/us/a-nation-challenged-the-president-bush-announces-a-
crackdown-on-visa-violators.html (internal quotation marks removed). 
 67 See BALKO, supra note 6, at 242. 
 68 See Brown, supra note 65, at 661. 
 69 See id. at 672–73. 
 70 Cadman Robb Kiker III, From Mayberry to Ferguson: The Militarization 
of American Policing Equipment, Culture, and Mission, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
ONLINE 282, 287–88 (2015). 
 71 Id. at 288. 
 72 See, e.g., John Payne, How Police Became a Standing Army, AM. 
CONSERVATIVE (Jan. 2, 2014), http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles
/how-police-became-a-standing-army/ (noting Los Angeles Chief of Police Daryl 
Gates asked Los Angeles Mayor Sam Yorty “to request permission from the De-
partment of Defense to fire a grenade into” the headquarters of the Black Pan-
thers.). 
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least two university police departments.73 The “1033 Program,” as 
codified in 10 U.S.C. § 2576(a),74 authorized the Secretary of De-
fense to provide “material support to authorized federal and state 
law enforcement agencies by transferring articles suitable for coun-
ter-drug and counter-terrorism activities.”75 This gave police un-
precedented access to military-grade equipment—everything from 
computers and first-aid kits to assault rifles and aircraft—to fight a 
“war” against American civilians.76 But when police wage “war” on 
American soil against American civilians, mistakes are bound to oc-
cur. 
II. FEAR LEADS TO ANGER, ANGER LEADS TO HATE, HATE LEADS 
TO SUFFERING: MILITARIZATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
There are very few people who would argue that there is never 
a need for police to have access to certain military equipment, train-
ing, and tactics.77 Situations involving hostages or an active shooter, 
such as the University of Texas at Austin incident, are examples of 
when a SWAT team may be the best option.78 Unfortunately, these 
legitimate uses of SWAT teams are few and far between.79 In 1995, 
more than 75% of all SWAT team deployments were to serve drug 
warrants.80 In fact, the Saint Louis County, Missouri Police Depart-
ment stated that it was “their standard procedure to use a SWAT 
                                                                                                             
 73 See Tyler Kingkade & Alexandra Svokos, Campus Police Are Stocking Up 
On Military-Grade Weapons, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 15, 2015, 5:47 PM), http:
//www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/15/campus-police-weapons_n_5823310.h
tml (noting that at least sixty-three college campuses have obtained M-16s, four-
teen received M-14s, and at least six campuses have mine resistant vehicles pro-
vided by the Department of Defense). 
 74 See generally 10 U.S.C. § 2576(a) (2012); see also Nathan James & Daniel 
H. Else, The “Militarization” of Law Enforcement and the Department of De-
fense’s “1033 Program”, CRS INSIGHTS (Dec. 2, 2014), https://www.fas.org/sgp
/crs/natsec/IN10138.pdf. 
 75 See James & Else, supra note 74. 
 76 Id. 
 77 See BALKO, supra note 6, at 230. 
 78 See id. at 56–58. 
 79 See Kiker, supra note 70, at 289 (citing an ACLU report that states that 
SWAT teams were deployed for active shooter or hostage situations only seven 
percent of the time). 
 80 BALKO, supra note 6, at 175. At that time over 45% of all SWAT teams 
trained with active-duty military personnel. See id. 
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team to serve any felony warrant.”81 Often times, SWAT deploy-
ments such as these end with disastrous results.82 
A. The Civilian Casualties 
In 1971, based on a tip that they would find a multimillion-dollar 
Phencyclidine (“PCP”) lab, local police and federal law enforce-
ment officials conducted a raid on the Dickerson Ranch.83 The only 
problem was that Dirk Dickerson and his girlfriend, Judy Arnold, 
were not drug kingpins; instead, they were hippies making a living 
off woodworking and carpentry.84 Nineteen law enforcement offi-
cials conducted this raid using helicopters and assault rifles.85 Sadly, 
when Dickerson attempted to run from these unknown attackers, he 
was shot and killed.86 Dickerson was unarmed, but the officer who 
shot him thought Dickerson shot another law enforcement official 
who actually tripped getting out of the helicopter.87 
Again in 1985, when the LAPD first attempted to deploy an ar-
mored vehicle modified with a battering ram to aid in a raid on a 
suspected crack house, the results were less than stellar.88 The 
founder of the SWAT team, Gates, ordered the vehicle to ram a hole 
in the side of the target home.89 After destroying the side of the 
house, the only thing they found were two women and three children 
eating ice cream.90 To add insult to the damage, when the armored 
vehicle was backing out of the driveway, it lost control on a patch 
of ice and hit a parked car.91 
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Courts have recently begun to notice the misuse of SWAT 
teams.92 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
initially ruled in Berry v. Leslie that police using SWAT tactics to 
perform a regulatory raid on a barber shop violated the Fourth 
Amendment.93 Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit allowed a civil rights claim to continue based on a Lou-
isiana Police SWAT raid of a nightclub performed under the guise 
of a regulatory inspection.94 On the other hand, in some jurisdic-
tions, justice may be harder to find.95 The SWAT team that raided 
the wrong house and shot and killed 7-year-old Aiyana Stanley-
Jones was cleared of any wrongdoing.96 The prosecutor dropped the 
charges, with the sole explanation being that his decision was in the 
“best interests of justice.”97 A SWAT team member in Georgia was 
also cleared of any wrongdoing after executing a “no-knock” war-
rant in which the team threw a flash bang grenade into a home, 
where it landed and exploded inside of a baby’s crib with the baby 
inside.98 
B. The Officer Casualties 
While officer safety is often given as a reason to justify the use 
of such tactics, the officers themselves are not always immune from 
the consequences of their overly aggressive actions. In Ker v. State 
of California, Justice Brennan’s dissent cited the English common 
law tradition of the “Castle Doctrine.”99 He noted a case in which a 
defendant, charged with killing an officer of the crown, was acquit-
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ted because the officer, who failed to announce himself while at-
tempting to serve a warrant, was mistaken for an intruder.100 This 
opinion showed a particularly keen sense of foresight—predicting 
both the rash of wrong home raids and the ensuing officer casualties 
inflicted by civilians who thought they were defending themselves 
from criminal intruders.101 
The dangers of such raids can be seen in places like Texas, where 
an early morning “no-knock” raid resulted in the death of one officer 
and the wounding of another when the suspect opened fire on police 
who he believed were intruders.102 While the police were given in-
formation that the home was used to distribute drugs, evidence sub-
sequently gathered at the scene showed no actual drugs were present 
on the premises.103 A Texas grand jury later refused to indict the 
suspect, accepting that he did in fact believe the police were crimi-
nals trying to break into his home.104 In Maryland, a police officer 
was shot by a fellow officer while setting up a hydraulic ram in prep-
aration for a “no-knock” entry.105 The suspect surprised the officers 
when he unknowingly opened the front door; officers immediately 
opened fire, shooting the suspect in the face and fellow officer Pat-
rick Murphy—who was crouched in the doorway setting up the 
ram—in the back of the head.106 These are not isolated incidents; 
police officers have been killed during pre-dawn, “no-knock” raids 
in New York, Florida, and California as well.107 Even on the occa-
sions when evidence of a crime is actually found, the evidence rarely 
justifies the amount of force used to obtain it.108 
In the age of cell phones and video recordings, police also have 
to worry about another issue: retaliation. The recent shootings of 
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Alton Sterling109 and Philando Castile110 by police officers and the 
accompanying videos have angered minority communities nation-
wide and caused horrific incidents. In July 2016, Micah Johnson 
gunned down five Dallas police officers, claiming it was in retalia-
tion to the recent police shootings of both Sterling and Castile.111 
Later that month, Gavin Long took the life of three more police of-
ficers after voicing his frustration over the death of Sterling and Cas-
tile.112 These retaliatory actions stemming from frustration over po-
lice shootings reinforces the “us-versus-them” mentality.113 
C. The “Us-versus-Them” Mentality and the Lack of 
Accountability 
The job of a modern police officer is not easy. On the one hand, 
police officers are tasked with protecting civilians and upholding the 
law; on the other, they are tasked with fighting a war. Be it a war on 
crime, drugs, or even terror, the rhetoric of war can affect the way 
law enforcement officials choose to protect civilians.114 They must 
choose between upholding the Constitution—which guarantees cer-
tain rights to civilians—and answering the call to war.115 The idea 
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of the officers fighting a “just war” makes the transition from “Of-
ficer Friendly” to “Officer Rambo” not only possible, but much 
more likely.116 This can be seen in how the priorities of certain de-
partments or SWAT teams shift from protecting the innocent to 
catching the criminal.117 In Waco, Texas, authorities could have eas-
ily captured David Koresh on his daily jog and avoided any unnec-
essary casualties.118 Instead, they planned for an attack on a heavily-
fortified compound and conducted a six-week siege that ended with 
the death of more than seventy-five people.119 
From an early point in their careers, law enforcement officers 
are taught an “Us-versus-Them” mentality.120 They are taught that 
everyone is a suspect and just about anyone can kill you within a 
moment’s notice.121 While there may be some truth to this theory, 
often times it can lead to mistakes with disastrous consequences.122 
For example, in September 2014, Levar Edward Jones was 
stopped by South Carolina state trooper Sean Groubert for a seatbelt 
violation. 123 When Groubert asked for Jones’ license, Jones reached 
into his vehicle to retrieve it.124 It was at this point, under the im-
pression that Jones was reaching for a weapon, that the trooper 
opened fire.125 Luckily for Jones, not only did he survive the inci-
dent, but it was captured on video on the trooper’s dash cam.126 The 
same cannot be said for Philando Castile, whose death was live-
streamed over the internet when he was fatally shot by police while 
allegedly reaching for his identification card during a traffic stop.127 
Then there was Johnathan Ferrell, a young man who was shot ten 
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times by a North Carolina police officer after he was looking for 
help following a car accident.128 The officer, of course, claimed self-
defense.129 Deven Guilford, a 17-year-old, was shot seven times by 
a Michigan police officer following an altercation that stemmed 
from Guilford flashing his high beams at a passing police car be-
cause the car’s head lights were blinding oncoming traffic.130 When 
the officer stopped Guilford, an argument ensued when Guilford re-
fused to produce his license.131 Guilford was dragged from his car, 
thrown to the ground, tased, and eventually shot to death.132 
While some of these incidents have resulted in criminal charges 
against the officer, far too many—including Guilford’s—have re-
sulted in no criminal liability.133 In fact, from 2004 to 2011, of the 
2,718 justified homicides by law enforcement, only forty-one offic-
ers were charged with either murder or manslaughter.134 As an in-
creasing number of these incidents are captured on video and police 
officers fail to be held accountable, the mistrust and fear of police 
will only worsen. 
III. THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK: A HISTORY OF MILITARY POLICE 
ACTIONS 
Since the birth of this nation, people have always been cautious 
about allowing the military to perform police actions.135 The fear 
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stemmed from British soldiers enforcing the Crown’s laws with lit-
tle to no accountability.136 The fear was so great that it was even 
expressed in the Third Amendment of the Constitution,137 the Insur-
rection Act,138 and the Posse Comitatus Act (“PCA”).139 As Cynthia 
Brown points out: 
The objectives of military forces are directed toward 
the capture or destruction of assets, and any level of 
force necessary to achieve the objectives is author-
ized. Police, on the other hand, enforce laws and keep 
the peace applying the minimal force necessary, 
bound by law to ensure civil liberties and protect 
life.140 
This section argues that, while police forces are becoming more 
militaristic, the military has become much more cautious in its ap-
plication of force and in turn has become much more police-like. 
A. Early Days of Military Police Actions 
Whenever the military gets involved in civilian matters, the re-
sults are often unpredictable.141 Because of the nature of their train-
ing, often times the mission objectives come before the rights of ci-
vilians.142 For example, in the summer of 1932, American World 
War I veterans set up camp outside of the White House.143 They 
were protesting the fact that the government withheld bonuses it 
promised to pay them for their service in the war.144 This “Bonus 
March” would soon end in tragedy.145 After an altercation with local 
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police, President Hoover requested assistance from the Army.146 
Two regiments under the command of General Douglas MacArthur, 
Major George S. Patton, and Major Dwight Eisenhower proceeded 
to attack their fellow veterans with tanks, tear gas, and bayonets.147 
As the protesters scattered and Hoover ordered a retreat, MacArthur 
refused to stand down and chased the protesters back to their camp 
and burned it to the ground.148 At a later press conference, MacAr-
thur showed no remorse, referring to the protestors as a “mob” and 
explaining that his actions prevented an insurrection.149 
In 1935, the U.S. Army made its Basic Field Manual available 
to the public.150 In the section dealing with handling domestic dis-
turbances, it recommended such tactics as firing into the crowd ra-
ther than over their heads, and even included instructions on how to 
effectively use chemical warfare, artillery, machine guns, mortars, 
grenades, tanks, and planes against civilians.151 Other manuals re-
ferred to democracy with contempt, relating it to “demagogism” and 
“anarchy.”152 The Army published what amounted to an instruction 
manual on how to wage war against America.153 What is more 
shocking are the views of General Patton, arguably one of Amer-
ica’s greatest war heroes.154 Not only did he think that habeas corpus 
was a hindrance, he recommended shooting captured rioters instead 
of turning them over to police for fear that they may be released on 
a technicality.155 He wrote: “If it is necessary to use machine guns, 
aim at their feet. If you must fire, DO A GOOD JOB. A few casual-
ties become martyrs; a large number become an object lesson.”156 
However, the use of the military to enforce domestic laws has 
not always resulted in tragedy. Following the 1954 Supreme Court 
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decision in Brown v. Board of Education, public schools were or-
dered to be integrated.157 When it came time to integrate Central 
High School in Little Rock, Arkansas in 1957, then-Governor Orval 
Faubus vehemently objected.158 He went so far as to mobilize the 
National Guard to prevent the first African-American students from 
entering the school.159 President Dwight Eisenhower refused to send 
federal troops at first, perhaps as a result of the “Bonus March” and 
the fear of what military troops might do to the protestors.160 Instead, 
he met with Faubus face-to-face and tried to convince the governor 
to comply.161 After several failed attempts, President Eisenhower 
mobilized the U.S. Army 101st Airborne Division and simultane-
ously federalized the Arkansas National Guard.162 By the end of 
September 1957, the so-called “Little Rock Nine” entered Central 
High School as the first African-American students to attend the 
prestigious institution.163 The military units remained until the end 
of the school year to protect those students.164 
While the military’s actions following Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation could be viewed as a bright spot in military–civilian interac-
tions, military confrontations with protestors are typically more 
tragic. On April 30th, 1970, amid promises to end the Vietnam War, 
President Nixon announced that he would be invading Cambodia, 
thus expanding the war.165 Protest immediately sprung up on cam-
puses across the country.166 
Following a violent confrontation between protestors and local 
police on May 1st, Kent, Ohio Mayor Leroy Satrom and Governor 
James Rhodes activated the Ohio National Guard.167 By May 4th, 
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3,000 demonstrators were face-to-face with 100 armed Ohio Na-
tional Guard members.168 When the order came down to disperse the 
crowd, the soldiers readied their weapons and fired tear gas into the 
crowd.169 The soldiers advanced to disperse the crowd and for some 
reason, as they were returning to the main protest area, almost thirty 
of the soldiers began to fire their weapons into the crowd.170 At the 
end of the day, four Kent State University students were killed and 
another nine students were injured.171 The soldiers claimed self-de-
fense and that the demonstrators were advancing on their position, 
but all of the victims were shot at distances between sixty and 750 
feet away.172               
B. Military Policing in Iraq and Afghanistan and the Principle of 
Distinction 
There is an old adage that “all is fair in love and war.”173 While 
that may be true for love, war has rules. The International Law of 
Armed Conflict (“LOAC”) and the Geneva Conventions are just a 
few laws that regulate how militaries are allowed to conduct war.174 
While it is incumbent on the soldier to avoid unnecessary civilian 
casualties, enemy combatants must make an effort to distinguish 
themselves from the civilian population.175 In a traditional war, that 
is normally the case; opposing sides wearing different uniforms 
fighting force on force in open fields.176 Unfortunately, that is not 
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how the enemy combatants in modern warfare—as seen in Iraq and 
Afghanistan—have chosen to fight.177 All too often, they attack 
from apartment buildings, mosques, or crowded markets, sometimes 
with firearms, sometimes with improvised explosive devices 
(“IEDs”), and even the occasional suicide attack.178 With the mili-
tary under heightened scrutiny for its use of force on civilians, and 
soldiers increasingly tasked with policing duties, the United States 
has had to change its strategy for fighting these wars.179 
Once major combat operations in Baghdad, Iraq ended in May 
of 2003, the U.S. military found itself in the difficult position of be-
ing in an area still hostile to occupying forces but tasked with per-
forming normal policing duties.180 Fred Abrahams argues that being 
in such a situation does not absolve the military from using force in 
a restrained, proportionate, and discriminate matter, and most im-
portantly, only when strictly required.181 Unfortunately, this was not 
always the case, especially in early 2003.182 Abrahams writes about 
the three categories of excessive violence that occurred in Baghdad: 
(1) military raids; (2) soldiers responding indiscriminately when un-
der attack; and (3) killing at checkpoints for failure to stop.183 
Soldiers would conduct raids on homes looking for weapons or 
members of armed groups, similar to the “no-knock” raids per-
formed by American police forces.184 Often times, when the soldiers 
encountered armed resistance from civilians who thought they were 
acting in self-defense, the soldiers would react by not only killing 
the family members, but also sometimes neighbors or random pass-
ers-by who would get caught in the crossfire.185 Soldiers would 
sometimes come under direct attack while out on patrol, usually 
starting with an IED attack.186 While the actual threat was real, sol-
diers often responded by firing their weapons without identifying 
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the enemy position and risking the lives of nearby civilians.187 At 
military checkpoints, drivers were often confused by conflicting in-
structions and the existing language barrier, resulting in the possi-
bility of being shot.188 
At this point, the similarities between police tactics and those of 
the military should be clear. The 7-year-old who died in a “no-
knock” raid in Detroit189 could have easily been in Baghdad. Indis-
criminate firing of a weapon when you believe you are being at-
tacked sounds very similar to when Dirk Dickerson was shot during 
the botched drug raid.190 We should not forget Mr. Jones, who was 
shot multiple times while attempting to comply with the police of-
ficer’s confusing order.191 
Back in Baghdad, leadership began to realize what the problem 
was.192 Not only did troops fail to receive adequate training on ci-
vilian policing, they lacked proper support, equipment, and transla-
tors to communicate with the civilians.193 As one soldier put it, he 
was being “asked to go from killing the enemy to protecting and 
interacting, and back to killing again.”194 In order to deal with this 
new environment, special instructors were brought in to help them 
more quickly adapt to the ever-changing battlefront.195 Forces fo-
cused on wining the “hearts and minds” of the Iraqi civilians by fo-
cusing on their safety and protection from insurgents instead of 
solely the soldiers’ personal safety.196 Iraqi police began to accom-
pany soldiers on raids and conduct raids themselves while policing 
duties were slowly handed off to Iraqi forces.197 
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While there were many civilian casualties in Iraq, the problems 
in Afghanistan were far worse.198 The nature of the Taliban fighters 
made it difficult to distinguish them from normal civilians.199 In fact, 
it was part of their strategy to attack from civilian locations in hopes 
that coalition forces would either not return fire or return fire and 
risk killing innocent civilians.200 In order to combat this problem, 
special Rules of Engagement were developed for Afghanistan.201 
These rules focused on proving “hostile act” and “hostile intent” in 
order to identify enemy combatants.202 While the definition of “hos-
tile act” is straightforward,203 “hostile intent” required some mani-
festation of evidence that the suspected enemy combatant was pre-
paring for an attack, such as maneuvering a weapon into launch po-
sition, or preparing to lay mines.204 Even attacking in self-defense 
needed a showing of either a hostile act or intent as opposed to a 
subjective belief.205    
IV. A NEW HOPE: HOW TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEMS OF 
MILITARIZATION AND RESTORE TRUST IN THE POLICE 
“The first step in solving a problem is to recognize that it does 
exist.”206 Between 2003 and 2013, British officers fired their guns 
fifty-one times; in a ten-year period, Canada had only twelve fatal 
police shootings; and Japan has not had a police shooting since 
2012.207 In contrast, from January to July of 2015, there were more 
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than 400 fatalities caused by police gunshots in the United States.208 
In 2013, the violent crime rate dropped to its lowest point since 
1978; however, in 2013, police killed 461 felony suspects—the 
highest total in twenty years.209 There should be no reason that 
American police kill more civilians in one month than an entire 
country does in 100 years.210 Thus, in order to address this problem, 
the focus should be on initial police screening and training, demili-
tarization of police forces, and accountability. 
A. Police Training 
Officer Timothy Loehmann, the police officer who shot 12-year-
old Tamir Rice, resigned from a previous job as a police officer 
when he was found “emotionally unstable and unfit for duty, espe-
cially in his handling of firearms.”211 When Officer David Eric 
Casebolt assaulted a young girl outside of a pool party in Texas, his 
justification for his actions was that he was addressing two previous 
calls that day and the stress caused “his emotions to get the better of 
him.”212 While being a police officer is a stressful and dangerous job 
that can negatively affect the individual, having someone with 
known emotional problems or an inability to handle stressful situa-
tions while on duty is just a disaster waiting to happen. 
On the training front, there needs to be an end to the “Us-versus-
Them” mentality. Such a philosophy is one that is instilled in young 
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police officers as early as the police academy.213 That philosophy 
only leads to a lack of trust between civilians and police.214 Further-
more, a greater emphasis should be placed on de-escalation train-
ing.215 The aggressive policing tactics of making arrests and issuing 
citations for minor infractions runs countercurrent to the concurrent 
goals of arresting major criminals and fostering trust within the com-
munity.216 Police academy training can vary by state, with hours of 
training ranging from 120 hours to nearly 1,000 hours.217 On aver-
age, police receive far less training in de-escalation than they do in 
handling firearms and defensive training.218 
When it comes to weapon training, the focus should be placed 
on non-lethal weapons, such as batons and Tasers, as opposed to 
firearms. In Oklahoma, a reserve deputy shot and killed—by acci-
dent—a suspect who was handcuffed and on the ground.219 The dep-
uty claimed in defense that he was trying to reach for his stun gun 
instead of his handgun and was confused in the moment.220 One can-
not help but think that if he were more familiar with his stun gun 
instead of his handgun, the suspect would still be alive. 
B. Demilitarization 
Another step in restoring relations between police and the com-
munity is to demilitarize the police force. Armored vehicles, gre-
nade launchers, and heavily armed SWAT teams are not needed in 
every city. The data speaks clearly to the fact that a vast majority of 
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SWAT deployments are not for riot control or active shooter situa-
tions, but rather to serve warrants.221 This has become so apparent 
that in Arkansas, a SWAT team was activated to patrol a small town 
and ask people for identification; refusal to show a form of identifi-
cation potentially resulted with a charge of obstruction.222 
In the 1970s, bucking the trend of militarization, the head of the 
D.C. Metro Police, Jerry Wilson, decided to focus on community 
engagement instead of aggressive policing.223 Wilson used technol-
ogy to increase response time to civilian complaints, not to increase 
firepower.224 He refused to use “no-knock” raids and looked to hire 
police officers from within the community.225  As a result, the crime 
rate in D.C. dropped significantly as the national crime rate contin-
ued to increase.226 
After a series of botched raids and questionable shootings by po-
lice, city officials in San Diego completely revamped their police 
operations to address the rising discontent in the community.227 
Community leaders opened a hotline for civilians to report police 
abuse, kept in close contact with local minority and civil rights lead-
ers, and set up a telethon for community members to have on-air 
conversations with them.228 When California erupted in protest after 
the Rodney King verdict, San Diego police were dispatched to the 
neighborhoods as a show of support, not a show of force.229 Imagine 
how differently the recent protests in Ferguson, Missouri230 or Bal-
timore, Maryland231 would have been if the police were there to sup-
port the protests, rather than to stop them. 
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C. Accountability 
Being able to hold the police accountable for their actions is in-
tegral to repairing the lack of trust towards the police. Accountabil-
ity was one of the main reasons why the Founders wanted a separate 
police force instead of the military.232 Proponents of police body 
cameras advocate for video technology in order to protect both the 
police officer and the civilian from frivolous claims.233 We also need 
better, proactive community oversight of police, so as to help curb 
police misconduct.234 Finally, if there are charges to be levied 
against an officer, a special prosecutor can mitigate the perceived 
conflict of interest between the state and local law enforcement.235 
Digital videos are commonplace now and there is an increasing 
body of data showing evidence of police brutality.236 After seeing 
incidents like those that happened with Eric Garner,237 John Craw-
ford,238 and Walter Scott,239 it is easy to see why the need for an 
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objective observer is necessary. Body cameras are generally be-
lieved to increase oversight, transparency, and community rela-
tions.240 
Civilian complaints about police misconduct are not always 
suited for criminal or civil proceedings.241 There needs to be an in-
vestigative body outside of the police department because, in many 
cases, internal investigations do not bear any fruit.242 For complaints 
of this nature, civilian oversight boards can be the most appropriate 
place to hear these complaints.243 Similarly, such an oversight board 
can be used to keep tabs on police activity. In Maryland, the legis-
lature passed a bill that required the state police departments to pe-
riodically submit a report on the number of times a SWAT team was 
deployed and for what reason.244 These measures will add an ele-
ment of transparency to the system and allow for an adequate place 
to voice grievances similar to the strategies applied in San Diego in 
the early 1990s.245 
Finally, in a case where a police officer is charged with a crime, 
the state needs to appoint a special prosecutor. In a normal case, 
prosecutors and police officers work together to ensure justice is 
achieved.246 Unfortunately, when a prosecutor has to indict a police 
officer, there are often accusations of a conflict of interest.247 When 
the average indictment rate in federal cases is near 100%, but the 
indictment rate of police officers involved in a shooting is closer to 
1.5%, the idea that there is a conflict of interest seems highly plau-
sible.248 One suggestion is to create an independent “Special Prose-
cutor’s Office” within each Office of the Attorney General, with the 
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sole mission of investigating police or public official misconduct.249 
This would create an extra layer of insulation between the state and 
local law enforcement.250 While there is no guarantee that a special 
prosecutor will fix the indictment rate, it will at least be a step closer 
to removing the taint of prejudice in favor of the officer.251 
CONCLUSION 
Over the years, civilian law enforcement has experienced a slow 
progression towards increased militarization. In an attempt to meet 
the national call to arms for wars on crime, drugs, and terror, police 
forces have felt obliged to adopt the aggressive tactics of the military 
in the daily enforcement of laws.252 With ready access to military-
grade equipment, the need to justify their necessity has led depart-
ments to use these weapons of war in the most mundane law en-
forcement circumstances.253 In doing so, many police departments 
have damaged their relationships with the communities they are 
sworn to protect, resulting in resentment towards the police.254 In an 
interesting juxtaposition, while police departments have found 
themselves becoming more militaristic, the military has found itself 
acting more as police officers and peacekeepers than soldiers.255 
While addressing the issues with the military is outside of the scope 
of this Comment, it is interesting to note how quickly soldiers 
adapted to their new dual mission as peacekeepers.256 In order for 
police to re-adapt to the role they play in society, they must focus on 
better training, demilitarization, and accountability for their actions. 
Without these steps, the balance to the force will never be restored. 
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